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its increased use, targeted killing has proved a divisive practice and generated considerable controversy. Many criticized the lethal targeting of a U.S. citizen in 2011 as violative of U.S. law and a deprivation of due process. Still, international and domestic law appear to support the government's ability to lethally target U.S. citizens.
To date, however, the government has demonstrated little transparency and no public accountability regarding this contentious and sensitive practice. While some degree of secrecy is warranted, the government must be more forthcoming if it wants to maintain the viability of an increasingly important tactic in the war on terror, especially where the targeting of U.S. citizens is involved.
CITIZENS IN THE CROSSHAIRS: READY, AIM, HOLD YOUR FIRE?
Shortly before 10 o'clock on the morning of September 30, 2011, a group of men including an al Qaeda leader finished eating breakfast and headed toward their vehicles near the remote town of Khashef in Yemen's northern Al Jawf province. Unbeknownst to them, the men had been under constant surveillance for some time. Overhead, two armed Predator unmanned aerial systems (UAS)-commonly referred to as dronesclosed in on the group. Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Predators fired Hellfire missiles killing the men, including the al Qaeda leader. 1 On its face, the above scenario would seem fairly unremarkable to most observers. In over 10 years of prosecuting its war on terror, the United States has conducted hundreds of similar strikes. In fact, however, the scenario is quite remarkable for one simple fact: the al Qaeda leader intentionally targeted and killed that day, Anwar al-Awlaki, was a U.S. citizen. directed by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), such as the Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden. 4 While the latter constitute the majority of targeted killing operations, the use of armed UAS strikes has steadily grown as a cheaper, safer,
and arguably more precise alternative to boots on the ground.
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Despite its increased use, targeted killing has proved divisive, generating considerable controversy on legal and moral grounds. 6 Domestically, the debate surrounding the practice rose to a crescendo first following the disclosure in January 2010 of al-Awlaki's inclusion on DoD and CIA kill or capture lists, and again when he was successfully targeted and killed. 7 Critics variously claim that targeted killing is contrary to international and human rights law, and that the U.S. government's lethal targeting of its own citizens violates domestic law. Moreover, supporters and critics alike express dismay over the government's lack of transparency and perceived lack of accountability.
This paper first defines targeted killing, then frames the debate over the lethal targeting of U.S. citizens. Next, the paper demonstrates that under the right circumstances, the U.S. government may-as the Obama Administration assertslawfully pursue a policy of lethally targeting its citizens abroad. Finally, the paper argues that while there is currently broad domestic support for the lethal targeting of suspected terrorists overseas-including those who happen to be U.S. citizens-the continued viability of such a policy relies in no small measure on increased transparency and accountability. 8 
Defining Targeted Killing
There is no universally accepted definition of targeted killing. Indeed, the term became commonplace only in 2000 when Israel openly acknowledged an official policy of targeted killing in response to the second intifada. 9 In a case challenging that policy, the Israeli Supreme Court characterized the practice as security forces acting "to kill members of terrorist organizations involved in the planning, launching, or execution of terrorist attacks against Israel." 10 Some commentators define the term broadly to encompass a state's intentional use of lethal force in a wide range of contexts from armed conflict, to assassination, to law enforcement. 11 Others define it more narrowly, strictly limiting the practice to armed conflict.
12
This paper addresses the employment of targeted killing in the context of the U.S. war on terror, which includes not only armed conflict but also the use of force in self-defense that may not rise to the level of armed conflict. Accordingly, the paper defines targeted killing as a state's intentional killing of a specific individual who is an unlawful combatant, during armed conflict or the legitimate exercise of national selfdefense.
The adjective "unlawful" is significant. The law of war recognizes two categories of individuals in international (i.e., state versus state) armed conflict: combatants and civilians. 13 Combatants include members of the armed forces of a state that is a party to an armed conflict, and everyone else who satisfies the criteria for prisoner of war status. 14 Importantly, combatants have "the right to participate directly in hostilities," and may be targeted anywhere, at any time, so long as they are not hors de combat.
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Everyone else is a civilian. 16 Civilians may not be intentionally targeted but have an obligation not to directly participate in hostilities. Civilians who disregard that obligation become "unlawful combatants" and lose their immunity from attack, at least for the period of direct participation. 17 The law of war does not expressly recognize a combatant category in non- 20 Moreover, critics express concern that targeted killings have impacted a disproportionate number of civilians. 21 Proponents of targeted killing counter that it is distinguishable from assassination; that while state sovereignty is an important consideration, the U.S. should not be tied to a single "hot" battlefield while Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) are able to relocate their operations at will; and that while civilian casualties are regrettable and mistakes sometimes occur, targeted killing is overall a very precise tool.  is located in a foreign country,  is a senior operational leader of AQAM,  is "actively engaged in planning to kill Americans,"  "poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States," and  cannot feasibly be captured. guidance does not go far enough in solving the revolving door issue. 41 Nonetheless, the combination of the traditional "direct participation in hostilities" standard for the occasional "foot soldier," and the "continuous combatant function" standard for those whose role is more significant, provides substantial leeway to lethally target members of armed groups like AQAM.
Some claim that the United States has cast the armed conflict net too wide, however. These critics assert that while the United States maintains it is engaged in a "global" conflict with AQAM, it is presently engaged in only a single armed conflict to which the law of war and its more permissive targeting rules apply: the non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan. 42 He instead viewed secession as an invalid act with no legal effect, such that
Confederates remained U.S. citizens. 58 Faced with an armed rebellion by U.S. citizens, the government adopted a novel legal approach giving rebels a "double character": they were at the same time criminals, subject to criminal prosecution with concomitant constitutional protections, and enemies, subject solely to the law of war. 59 The government had discretion to choose which paradigm to apply.
The Supreme Court sustained this "double character" approach in The Prize
Cases, involving the seizure of four vessels violating President Lincoln's 1861 blockade of southern ports. The ships' owners maintained that the United States did not have the right to seize their cargoes as "enemies' property" because "the term 'enemy' is properly applicable to those only who are subjects or citizens of a foreign State at war with our own." 60 Moreover, the owners asserted that they had a "right to claim the protection of the government for their persons and property, and to be treated as loyal citizens till legally convicted of having renounced their allegiance and made war against the Government . . . ." 61 Rejecting those arguments, the Court observed that, "it is a proposition never doubted that the belligerent party who claims to be sovereign may exercise both the belligerent and sovereign rights." 62 The Court then declared that the owners "have cast off their allegiance and made war on their Government, and are nonetheless enemies because they are traitors." 63 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions continue to find that U.S. citizens can be enemy belligerents subject to the law of war. In Ex Parte Quirin, a World War II case, eight German saboteurs-including Herbert Hans Haupt, a U.S. citizen-sought a writ of habeas corpus after being tried and sentenced to death by a military tribunal. 64 The saboteurs alleged that President Roosevelt had no authority to try them by military tribunal, and that they were instead entitled to criminal trials in civil court with Fifth and Applying the result in Hamdi, some argue that if a U.S. citizen detained by the government is entitled to due process, surely a U.S. citizen is also entitled to at least as much due process before the government can intentionally target and kill him. While that proposition sounds reasonable on its face, it ignores important factual distinctions.
Hamdi applies to a citizen challenging the basis for his detention who is already in the hands of the government and being held in the United States. Indeed, the plurality noted that,
The parties agree that initial captures on the battlefield need not receive the process we have discussed here; that process is due only when the determination is made to continue to hold those who have been seized. 70 This language reflects a desire to avoid unduly interfering with the executive branch's prosecution of an armed conflict and suggests a distinction between pre-and postcapture situations. Once captured, an enemy poses little continuing risk to the United
States and, therefore, should plausibly be entitled to exercise at least some of the constitutional rights he is otherwise entitled to. 71 On the other hand, an enemy at large represents an ongoing threat. While a seductive argument, Hamdi cannot therefore be read as requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen. Rather, some suggest, Hamdi seems to require only the possibility of ex post judicial review. 72 Moreover, the executive branch can arguably meet its due process obligations through robust internal and perhaps external oversight mechanisms, as discussed below. preclude the use of military force against "legitimate targets" during both armed conflict and peacetime (i.e., during the exercise of self-defense). 77 Parks addressed only the use of force by members of the armed forces, however, who are considered combatants and therefore entitled under the law of war to combatant immunity for their warlike acts. 78 Some commentators observe that while the assassination ban does not apply to armed forces personnel, the same may not be true for targeted killings carried out by CIA personnel. 79 This issue may well be moot because of secret counterterrorism authorities granted to the CIA by Presidents
Reagan, Clinton, and George W. Bush, reportedly including at least limited sanction of overseas assassinations. 80 Moreover, even if targeted killing as a U.S. counter-terrorism tactic were deemed subject to E.O. 12333, the President could simply modify or even revoke the executive order.
Foreign Murder Statute
Title 18, section 1119(b) of the U.S. Code-commonly referred to as the foreign murder statute-makes it a crime for " [a] person who, being a national of the U.S., kills or attempts to kill a national of the U.S. while such national is outside the U.S. but within the jurisdiction of another country." 81 Some assert that this statute precludes the targeted killing of U.S. citizens, at least when carried out by someone other than a "lawful" combatant.
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Long ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains." 83 Applying this rule of construction, the law of war-which, as discussed above, permits the targeting of combatants, whether lawful or not, during armed conflict or in the exercise of self-defense-displaces the domestic law of the foreign murder statute. Accordingly, the foreign murder statute would not make the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen a criminal act in the context of an armed conflict or self-defense. 84 As with E.O. 12333's assassination ban, this conclusion may depend on the status of the individual who actually "pulls the trigger": while a member of the armed forces entitled to combatant immunity would not be subject to the foreign murder statute, someone like a CIA employee arguably would. 85 Once again, however, authorities granted to the CIA could render the issue moot. Moreover, the foreign murder statute provides that, "[n]o prosecution may be instituted against any person under this section except upon the written approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General . . . ." 86 It seems inconceivable that, having ordered a CIA employee to engage in targeted killing, an administration would authorize the employee's subsequent prosecution under the foreign murder statute.
Absent a presidential pardon, however, a subsequent administration would not be precluded from undertaking such a prosecution. 87 In sum, while lingering concerns exist, the Obama Administration appears justified in its assertion that international and domestic law permit the targeted killing of U.S. citizens.
Transparency and Accountability
On his first day in office, President Obama told the White House senior staff that, "The way to make Government responsible is to hold it accountable. And the way to make Government accountable is to make it transparent so that the American people
can know exactly what decisions are being made, how they're being made, and whether their interests are being well served." 88 So far, there has been little transparency and no public accountability regarding the executive branch's use of targeted killing. While some degree of secrecy is understandable-perhaps even a substantial degree, at least with respect to information that might compromise intelligence sources and methods-the government must be more forthcoming with the American people if it wants to maintain the viability of this increasingly important tactic in the war on terror, especially where the targeting of U.S.
citizens is involved.
Transparency
Until recent comments by President Obama and a few senior administration officials, the government did not even publicly acknowledge its practice of targeted killing outside Iraq and Afghanistan, much less the lethal targeting of a U.S. citizen. 89 The majority of information about the practice comes from media reports citing anonymous sources. Indeed, when the ACLU submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the CIA and OLC seeking records pertaining to al-Awlaki's targeted killing, both responded that they could "neither confirm nor deny" the existence of the types of documents requested. 90 After receiving a similar response from OLC, the New York Times filed a lawsuit against the Department of Justice seeking compelled disclosure. As demonstrated above, one can make a good faith legal argument in support of the targeted killing of U.S. citizens. Nevertheless, prominent legal scholars dispute the practice's legality. 93 Similarly, unlike the overwhelmingly positive domestic reaction to Osama bin Laden's death during a kill or capture mission, the reaction to al-Awlaki's targeted killing has prompted mixed reactions from politicians, pundits, and the American public alike. 94 The subject is sufficiently sensitive, controversial, and significant-it is, after all, the government's exercise of the power to take a life, seemingly with little or no constraint-that the executive branch should do all it can to convince doubters of the validity of its actions. Regardless of the type of oversight implemented, some form of independent review is necessary to demonstrate accountability and bolster confidence in the targeted killing process.
Conclusion
The United States has increasingly relied on targeted killing as an important tactic in its war on terror and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. 106 This is entirely reasonable given current budgetary constraints and the appeal of targeted killing, especially UAS strikes, as an alternative to the use of conventional forces.
Moreover, the United States will likely again seek to employ the tactic against U.S.
citizens assessed to be operational leaders of AQAM. As demonstrated above, one can make a good faith argument that doing so is entirely permissible under both international and domestic law as the Obama Administration claims, the opinions of some prominent legal scholars notwithstanding. The viability of future lethal targeting of U.S. citizens is questionable, however, if the government fails to address legitimate issues of transparency and accountability. While the administration has recently made progress on the transparency front, much more remains to be done, including the release in some form of the legal analysis contained in OLC's 2010 opinion. Moreover, the administration must be able to articulate to the American people how it selects U.S.
citizens for targeted killing and the safeguards in place to mitigate the risk of error and abuse. Finally, these targeting decisions must be subject to some form of independent review that will both satisfy due process and boost public confidence. 44 In his speech, Holder asserted that, Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan.
Indeed, neither Congress nor our federal courts has limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan. We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone to shifting operations from country to country. Over the last three years alone, al Qaeda and its associates have directed several attacks -fortunately, unsuccessful -against us from countries other than Afghanistan. Our government has both a responsibility and a right to protect this nation and its people from such threats.
Holder speech. John Brennan likewise has stated that, "The U.S. does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qa'ida as being restricted solely to 'hot' battlefields like Afghanistan." Brennan speech. Moreover, in the detainee case Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the United States is engaged in a non-international armed conflict with Al Qaeda. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
